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Abstract: A false account of Marshall’s engagements with the historical school is found 
among modern commentators. This false account involves the central proposition that 
Marshall was an opponent of the historical school. This false account has survived and 
prospered because it has fitted into more general conceptions of intellectual history, held by 
both orthodox and heterodox economists. To many orthodox economists, Marshall was a hero 
who greatly contributed to the development of neoclassical economic theory, and fought 
valiantly against the ‘atheoretical’ historicists. Likewise, to many heterodox economists, 
Marshall was a villain who greatly contributed to the development of neoclassical economic 
theory, and machinated against the ‘more realistic’ historicists. Such statements are difficult 
to reconcile with the fact that Marshall repeatedly referred positively to the ideas of the 
German historical school. It is argued in this paper that Marshall’s opposition to the historical 
school was confined to its anti-theoretical wing, principally William Cunningham. In other 
important respects Marshall’s position was compatible with German and British historicism. 
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This essay explains why Alfred Marshall has been misunderstood in some modern accounts of 
his relationship with the historical school.[1] These misunderstandings are so pervasive that a 
false account of Marshall’s engagements with the historical school has emerged and spread 
among modern commentators. This false account involves the central proposition that 
Marshall was an opponent of the historical school. For instance, Robert Skidelsky (1983, p. 
43) stated that Marshall ‘rejected the main contentions of the German historical school’. 
Such statements are difficult to reconcile with the fact that Marshall in several places 
referred positively to members of the German historical school, in his Principles and 
elsewhere. In his 1979-81 lectures at the LSE, Lionel Robbins (1998, p. 306) attempted to 
explain away these little known positive comments. Robbins did so on the unsupported and 
implausible grounds that Marshall ‘was in some sense terrified’ of the German historicists. 
However, the only instance that Robbins could cite of a disagreement between Marshall and 
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any historicist was his altercation in Cambridge with William Cunningham. Furthermore, 
Robbins neglected to point out that in his debates with Cunningham, Marshall willingly 
accepted a core proposition of the historical school case and acknowledged the problem of 
historical specificity. This problem starts from the presumption that different socio-economic 
phenomena may require theories that are in some respects different from each other 
(Hodgson, 2001). Robbins blindly ignored the fact that Marshall (1949, p. 31) had openly 
declared in his Principles that ‘new … economic doctrines’ were required in different 
historical periods. On this issue, Cunningham and Marshall were on the same side, and 
Robbins on the other. By ignoring this central question and some further evidence discussed 
below, Robbins managed to rewrite history and infer that Marshall was an antagonist of the 
historical school. 
This false account has survived and prospered because it has fitted into more general 
conceptions of intellectual history, held by both orthodox and heterodox economists. To many 
orthodox economists, Marshall was a hero who greatly contributed to the development of 
neoclassical economic theory, and fought valiantly against the ‘atheoretical’ historicists at 
Cambridge. Likewise, to many heterodox economists, Marshall was a villain who greatly 
contributed to the development of neoclassical economic theory, and machinated against the 
‘more realistic’ historicists at Cambridge. The false account fits the prejudices on both sides. 
However, this account does not stand up to minimal critical scrutiny. It is a fact that 
Marshall openly and repeatedly praised and supported many of the ideas and leaders of the 
German historical school. Furthermore, he understood and addressed the problem of historical 
specificity in his writings. In other words, Marshall openly acknowledged that some economic 
systems in history might require some specific theories or principles to explain them that 
would not then apply to all economies. 
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As for the supporters of the historical school in Cambridge, the argument here is that 
that they were at least partly responsible for their own marginalisation. This was especially 
the case with Cunningham, who took an untenable methodological and theoretical position 
and alienated himself even from other historicist sympathisers. Herbert Foxwell – the other 
leading historicist in Cambridge – also does not fit into the standard account. Foxwell was 
Marshall’s close friend and ally until 1908, when Marshall’s decision not to back Foxwell as 
his successor for the Cambridge chair in economics forced them irrevocably apart. 
This 1908 incident reflects upon Marshall’s character. Again, he was far from the 
unprincipled schemer and operator that he has sometimes been depicted. True, he could be 
selfish, tactless, tiresome, obstinate, vain and humourless.[2] However, when he failed to 
support his closest friend Foxwell, it was not due to duplicity but on the grounds of his own 
honestly declared academic judgment. His verdict had some foundation. In about 1906 
Marshall had developed serious and ostensibly warranted reservations about Foxwell’s 
academic discernment and his capabilities as a teacher. Furthermore, in 1908, Foxwell’s 
record of academic publications was much inferior to that of the successful candidate for the 
Cambridge chair. 
Some accounts of the period have highlighted the policy disputes of the time, 
particularly over the issue of free trade. Gerard Koot (1987) for example, in an otherwise 
useful overview, brought policy controversies over free trade to the fore. For Koot, the 
‘mercantilism’ of the historical school took precedence over their methodology. However, 
there is neither a necessary nor a logical connection between the methodological standpoints 
of the historical school and any opposition to free trade. It is true that Marshall supported free 
trade and that several German historicists were critical of such a policy. Cunningham and 
Foxwell opposed Marshall on this question. But such policy controversies in Britain were 
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hardly a direct ‘clash of methods’ of the substance, tone and deep methodological impact of 
the great Continental battle between Carl Menger and Gustav Schmoller. 
Not only have Marshall’s relationships with the historical school been misunderstood; 
Marshall’s times also have been misunderstood. It has become a commonplace to refer to the 
1870s as the decade of ‘the marginal revolution’ in economic thought. Yet the more careful 
historians of ideas have shown clearly that it was less of a sudden revolution than an 
intermittent process, traceable back to the writings of a variety of economists working as early 
as the 1830s (Black et al., 1973; Howey, 1960; Ekelund and Hébert, 2002). Furthermore, its 
impact was delayed. Prior to 1890, most of the published general histories of economic 
thought failed to mention the term ‘marginal utility’. No written account of this supposed 
‘marginal revolution’ in ideas appeared until well into the twentieth century. 
For any informed economist working in the years from 1883 to 1914, the Austro-
German Methodenstreit was as recognisable and important an event as the latterly so-called 
‘marginal revolution’. Indeed, in retrospect, the deep methodological issues raised in this 
celebrated ‘clash of methods’ are even more momentous than the theoretical shift, pioneered 
by the marginalists, from cost-based to utility-based theories of price.[3]
 
It’s all in Marshall: His respect for the German historical school 
Marshall was one of the acknowledged pioneers of marginal utility theory. But it is important 
to note that this did neither place him in a close alliance with Carl Menger, nor make him an 
enemy of the German historicists. Marshall was fluent in German. Like many aspiring young 
economists in the nineteenth century, he went to Germany to study under the tutelage of 
members of the historical school. He was in Dresden in 1868 and in Berlin in 1870-71. He 
came into contact with several German economists, including Wilhelm Roscher. 
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In contrast to modern dismissals, references to the German historical school 
throughout Marshall’s writings are respectful and positive, rather than scornful or 
dismissive.[4] Emphatically, Marshall absorbed rather than rejected much of the doctrine of 
the German historical school (Hammond, 1991; Hutchison, 1998). Even in the later editions 
of his Principles, Marshall (1949, p. 634) retained a highly laudatory view of the German 
historicists: 
It would be difficult to overrate the value of the work which they and their fellow-
workers in other countries have done in tracing and explaining the history of economic 
habits and institutions. It is one of the great achievements of our age ... 
Accordingly, Marshall was not in general opposition to the historical school. On the contrary, 
he often praised their achievements. Furthermore, despite his controversies with some British 
historicists, during his lifetime Marshall was not depicted as a general opponent of 
historicism.[5]  
Nevertheless, Marshall’s economic thought was more individualistic and utilitarian 
than that of most German historicists. Many historical school economists had argued against 
the utilitarian view that human welfare could be equated with the satisfaction of subjective 
desires. However, even on this point, Marshall’s position was characteristically conciliatory. 
On the one hand, in his Principles, he described wealth as ‘desirable things … which satisfy 
wants.’ But on the other hand he admitted ‘those elements of the wealth of a nation which are 
commonly ignored when estimating the wealth of the individuals composing it’, including 
some of the ‘non-material elements’ stressed by ‘German economists’ (Marshall, 1949, pp. 
45, 49). Marshall’s utilitarianism, like Spencer’s, was not purely individualist or subjective. If 
happiness was conceived as the ultimate end, Marshall was just as interested in the concrete 
conditions under which happiness could prosper. Furthermore, Marshall was also influenced 
by the metaphor of the social organism, favoured by both Spencer and the German historical 
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school. This also qualified his individualistic outlook. Marshall (1949, pp. 20-21) wrote, in 
Spencerian terms, that ‘economists, like all other students of social science, are concerned 
with individuals chiefly as members of the social organism. … [The] life of society is 
something more than the sum of the lives of its individual members.’ 
It is useful to compare the methodological attitudes of Marshall and Menger, 
especially in relation to the older historical school. Like Menger, Marshall understood the 
limits of the inductive method. They both agreed that economics cannot proceed from facts 
alone. They also agreed that economics cannot avoid making use of some universal principles. 
Their methodologies both focused primarily on the individual, rather than the system. But 
there was a significant difference of emphasis. Marshall’s individualistic viewpoint was 
highly qualified. Having made the given, rational individual the universal foundation of 
economic theory, Marshall (1949, pp. 76, 631) then went on to qualify this in his Principles. 
He wrote of ‘new activities giving rise to new wants’, noting that human character ‘is a 
product of circumstances’ and acknowledging that ‘changes in human nature’ can be 
significant and rapid. 
Most strikingly, in contrast to Menger, Marshall did not reject the problem of 
historical specificity: unlike Menger he saw it as a legitimate and important question for 
economists. Crucially, Marshall acknowledged the principle of historical specificity in his 
inaugural lecture as Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge. This event was two years 
after Menger’s attack in the Untersuchungen. Every informed economist was aware of 
Menger’s controversial challenge to Germanic orthodoxy. Significantly, Marshall did not side 
with the anti-historicist counter-revolution. In his lecture, taking a historicist view, Marshall 
criticised the English economists of the early nineteenth century because ‘they did not see 
how liable to change are the habits and institutions of industry’ (Marshall, 1885, p. 155). 
Writing as if he were a card-carrying historicist, Marshall (p. 154) further noted that: 
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the mathematico-physical group of sciences ... have this point in common, that their 
subject-matter is constant and unchanged in all countries and in all ages. ... [But in 
contrast] if the subject-matter of a science passes through different stages of 
development, the laws which apply to one stage will seldom apply without 
modification to others; the laws of science must have a development corresponding to 
that of the things of which they treat. 
This is an unambiguous recognition of the problem of historical specificity. In this passage 
Marshall recognises, like the German historicists, that ‘laws which apply to one stage’ of 
economic development ‘will seldom apply without modification to others’. Likewise, in his 
Principles – the first edition of which appeared in 1890 – Marshall (1949, pp. 30-31) 
acknowledged that: ‘Though economic analysis and general reasoning are of wide application 
… every change in social conditions is likely to require a new development of economic 
doctrines.’ 
Consider the venom that many economists since the 1930s have directed against the 
German historical school. Compare Marshall’s contrasting sympathy for the ideas and 
achievements of the historicists.Today, anyone with historicist sympathies on the scale of 
Marshall’s would probably be barred even from a junior university post in any leading 
department of economics. 
Nevertheless, despite his outstanding achievements, detailed problems remained in 
Marshall’s methodological position. He did not elaborate nor explain how the ‘laws which 
apply to one stage’ should be modified and applied to another. He did not show what degree 
or type of modification he had in mind. To what extent, and in what manner, would economic 
theory have to change to be applied to a changed economic reality? No answer to this 
question was apparent. Marshall’s statements, while acceptable to many in the historical 
school, could be interpreted either in terms of mere parametric adjustment of an universal 
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theory, or that quite different laws would pertain from one historical period to another. 
Marshall fully acknowledged the problem of historical specificity but he did not make a 
sustained attempt to resolve it. Instead he concentrated on the formulation of the seemingly 
universal Principles, for which he became famous. 
 
Greedy for facts: But not by facts alone 
Philosophically, Marshall was an admirer of Immanuel Kant. From a similar perspective, 
Marshall recognised the limitations of all empirical enquiry. Kant (1929, p. 41) had argued in 
1781 that ‘though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all 
arises out of experience.’ Accordingly, without dismissing empirical work, Marshall (1885, p. 
171) recognised the need for additional, theoretical endeavour: 
Greedy then as the economist must be for facts, he must not be content with mere 
facts. Boundless as must be his gratitude to the great thinkers of the historic school, he 
must be suspicious of any direct light that the past is said to throw on the problems of 
the present. 
For Marshall, historical facts were essential, but they cannot on their own provide us with the 
answers (Marshall, 1949, p. 32). Thus at once he paid unbounded tribute to the work of the 
historical school, but simultaneously undermined the naive empiricist views in their midst. 
The naïve belief that facts alone were enough to derive universal principles was characteristic 
of the older historical school. But after the Methodenstreit many of the historicists took a 
more sophisticated view. Marshall was not attacking the historical school as a whole but the 
its surviving empiricist wing. Marshall (1885, p. 166) explained in his inaugural lecture that 
the mere observation of sequences of events explained nothing: 
facts by themselves are silent. Observation discovers nothing directly of the actions of 
causes, but only of sequences in time. ... In economic or social problems no event has 
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ever been the exact precedent of another. The conditions of human life are so various: 
every event is the complex result of so many causes, so closely interwoven that the 
past can never throw a simple and direct light on the future. 
Not only are facts unable to speak for themselves, but also the method of inductive inference 
is confounded by the complexity of economic phenomena. However, while showing that 
economics could not rely on induction alone, Marshall appealed to the authority of a leading 
and sophisticated member of the German historical school. In his Principles, Marshall (1949, 
p. 24) quoted and endorsed Schmoller’s statement that: ‘Induction and deduction are both 
needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the right foot are both needed for walking.’[6]
Accordingly, Marshall tried to appeal to both sides in the induction versus deduction 
debate. Although he accepted deduction, he was quite cautious in introducing deductive 
arguments based on universal assumptions. The deductive core was to be confined to such 
universal forces as supply and demand. In his inaugural lecture Marshall (1885, pp. 158-9) 
saw the central and universal core of economic theory as 
a machinery to aid us in reasoning about those motives of human action which are 
measurable. ... But, while attributing this high and transcendent universality to the 
central scheme of economic reasoning, we may not assign any universality to 
economic dogmas. ... It is not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery 
of concrete truth ...  
In his Principles, he outlined a similar idea. Appealing appropriately to biology, Marshall 
(1949, p. vii) suggested that amidst the historical or evolutionary variety found in economic 
and biotic phenomena, common features and principles might exist: 
As, in spite of the great differences in form between birds and quadrupeds, there is one 
Fundamental Idea running through all their frames, so the general theory of the 
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equilibrium of demand and supply is a Fundamental idea running through the frames 
of all the various parts of the central problem of Distribution and Exchange.  
For Marshall, some general principles were appropriate, corresponding to the elements that 
were common to diverse phenomena. He argued that the ‘general theory of the equilibrium of 
demand and supply’ formed an essential element of the deductive engine of economic theory. 
However, he wished to restrain and complement this engine’s powers. For instance, Marshall 
(1949, p. 638) warned that the function of 
analysis and deduction in economics is not to forge a few long chains of reasoning, but 
to forge rightly many short chains and single connecting links. ... as surely as every 
deduction must rest on the basis of inductions, so surely does every inductive process 
involve and include analysis and deduction. 
As a result, deduction had to be restrained and limited by empirical anchors. On the other 
hand, Marshall argued that the danger in some work of the historical school was that, in 
placing an impossible faith in facts alone, they were inattentive to their own acts of 
classification and logic; and they ignored their own use of deductive reasoning. 
When therefore it is said that a certain event in history teaches us this or that, an 
element of deductive reasoning is introduced, which is more likely to be fallacious the 
more persistently it is ignored. For the argument selects a few out of the group of 
conditions which were present when the event happened, and tacitly, if not 
unconsciously, assumes that the rest are irrelevant. The assumption may be justifiable: 
but it often turns out to be otherwise. (Marshall, 1885, p. 166) 
As a result 
the most reckless and treacherous of all theorists is he who professes to let facts and 
figures speak for themselves, who keeps in the background the part he has played, 
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perhaps unconsciously, in selecting and grouping them, and in suggesting the 
argument (Marshall, 1885, p. 168). 
Here Marshall turned the argument against the naïve empiricists. By claiming that truth is 
based on the facts alone, they had concealed the prior and unavoidable task of theory in 
selecting, understanding and arranging those facts. Empiricism was thus a ‘treacherous’ 
doctrine, because it downplayed the necessary role of the theorist and the comparison of 
different theoretical approaches. Those that claimed to build science on facts alone, deluded 
themselves and others into the false belief that theoretical preconceptions are avoidable. On 
this issue, Marshall, like Menger, was on strong philosophical ground. Empiricism is flawed 
as an epistemology, and induction alone is weak as a method. 
Overall, Marshall tried to steer an intermediate position between deductivism and 
empiricism. Although his philosophical position was underdeveloped, his intuitions were 
consistent and strong. He was highly sceptical of naïve empiricism, on the one hand, and of 
excessive deductivism and formalism, on the other. As further evidence of this we can cite an 
interesting correspondence between him and William A. S. Hewins, a man of historicist 
sympathies who was the first Director of the London School of Economics. Marshall wrote to 
Hewins on 12 October 1899, concerning the economics curriculum at the School: 
The fact is I am the dull mean man, who holds Economics to be an organic whole, and 
has little respect for pure theory (otherwise than as a branch of mathematics or the 
science of numbers), as for that crude collection and interpretation of facts without the 
aid of high analysis which sometimes claims to be part of economic history. 
(Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 256) 
Clearly, Marshall was trying to steer a middle course between overly mathematical economic 
theory and banal empiricism. Marshall again wrote to Hewins on 29 May 1900: 
 11
Much of ‘pure theory’ seems to me to be elegant toying: I habitually describe my own 
pure theory of international trade as a ‘toy’. I understand economic science to be the 
application of powerful analytical methods to unravelling the actions of economic and 
social causes, to assigning each its part, to tracing mutual interactions and 
modifications; and above all to laying bare the hidden causas causantes. (Whitaker, 
1996, vol. 2, p. 280) 
Along very similar lines, Marshall wrote to Francis Edgeworth on 28 August 1902: 
In my view ‘Theory’ is essential. … But I conceive no more calamitous notion than 
that abstract, or general, or ‘theoretical’ economics was economics ‘proper.’ It seems 
to me an essential but a very small part of economics proper: and by itself sometimes 
even – well, not a very good occupation of time. (Pigou, 1925, p. 437; Whitaker, 1996, 
vol. 2, p. 393) 
Sadly, a century later, the economics profession as a whole, including Marshall’s own Faculty 
of Economics at the University of Cambridge, has become much preoccupied with the 
‘elegant toying’ that Marshall had looked down upon so critically. The study of real causes 
within socio-economic systems, that Marshall saw as the essence of economic science, has 
become much less fashionable today than the exhibition of mathematical technique for its 
own sake. 
True to his Kantian affections, Marshall saw the priority of such a theory over 
empirical enquiry. Rightly recognising the limitations of empiricism, he searched for an over-
arching conceptual framework within which he could build his theoretical system. He thought 
that he had found the answer in the ‘synthetic philosophy’ of Herbert Spencer. Marshall thus 
followed Schmoller and others in importing ideas from Spencerian biology and philosophy 
into economics (Pribram, 1983, p. 217). 
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Even in biology, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Spencer rivalled Charles 
Darwin in standing. Trained in physics and mathematics, and being a brilliant polymath and 
synthesiser, Spencer made a significant contribution to biology and extended evolutionary 
ideas to ethics and social science. Spencer’s unified system of ideas was popular and 
engaging. It seemed that the natural and social sciences could be unified on the basis of a few 
universal principles. Spencer too offered the lure of a general theory. 
Marshall read his works avidly, incorporating several Spencerian notions into his 
economics (Hodgson, 1993; Thomas, 1991). As Peter Groenewegen (1995, p. 167) has 
remarked: ‘The significant influence of Spencer on Marshall’s thinking cannot be repeated 
too often’. Spencer provided the key theoretical, or rather meta-theoretical, framework upon 
which Marshall attempted to build. It was thus a great tragedy for Marshall that Spencer’s 
influence began to wane rapidly in the early years of the twentieth century (Hodgson, 1993). 
John Neville Keynes was an early pupil and devotee of Marshall. Keynes’s Scope and 
Method of Political Economy (1891) was largely an attempt to develop Marshall’s 
methodology, particularly by trying to steer between induction and deduction, and between 
description and formalism. Marshall read the proofs of the book and was quite positive about 
them, although he urged that more attention should be given to contemporary German 
economists (Moggridge, 1997, pp. 355-6). In his book, Keynes attempted to combine 
induction with deduction, arguing (p. 227) that economics ‘must both begin with observation 
and end with observation’. Observation to establish premises, deduction to reach conclusions, 
observation once more to verify them. This work also claimed a continuity of doctrine 
between the Marshallians at Cambridge and what had gone before. The text minimised 
theoretical confrontation and tried to find the best in all points of view. Accordingly, it failed 
to resolve many of the outstanding questions of methodological controversy. 
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The Methodendiskurs: Marshall and the British historicists 
Some members of the historical school in Britian were as misled by an empiricist 
epistemology as were their earlier co-thinkers in Germany.[7] Marshall countered them on this 
issue, promoting an ostensibly balanced position, with a role for both induction and 
deduction. He was careful to cite the authority of Schmoller on this point, and he recognised 
the value of the empirical work of the historical school. 
But even Marshall’s balanced statements went too far for Cunningham. Cunningham 
had studied briefly in Germany, in Tübingen in 1868 and Mannheim in 1874. He became a 
scholar at Trinity College in 1869 and was taught by Marshall. From 1878, Cunningham 
taught and examined history at Cambridge, and was appointed a University Lecturer in that 
subject in 1884. He was an applicant to the Cambridge chair to which Marshall was appointed 
in December 1884. To evade Marshall’s departmental authority, he resigned his university 
lectureship in 1888 to take up a fellowship at Trinity College. From 1891 to 1897, 
Cunningham was also Tooke Professor of Economics at King’s College, London.[8] He was an 
occasional teacher at the London School of Economics, from its foundation in 1895. In 1906 
he resigned his Trinity Fellowship. He was ordained in 1873 and was vicar at Great St. 
Mary’s church in Cambridge from 1887 until 1908, when he became Archdeacon of Ely. 
However, he still continued to give occasional lectures in Cambridge and London. 
Foxwell, another Cambridge historicist, was one of Marshall’s first pupils. He was 
elected a fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge in 1868. In 1881 he succeeded Jevons as 
professor of political economy at University College London, while retaining his fellowship at 
St. John’s. Until 1908 he was a very close friend of Marshall. Foxwell favoured the emphasis 
on demand in the writings of Malthus and Jevons, over the focus on costs of production in the 
works of Ricardo and Marx. Foxwell thus prefigured J. M. Keynes’s stress on ‘effective 
demand’ (Koot, 1987, ch. 6). In 1901 Foxwell emphasised that ‘in the economic region, all 
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practical questions should be determined on their merits, after detailed and historical 
investigation of the particular circumstances, and not by summary reference to maxims or 
dogmas supposed to be of universal application.’[9]
Nevertheless, this was not so far from the view of Marshall, and the two sometimes 
expressed their closeness on such matters. In their correspondence of 1897 on matters of 
method, Foxwell suggested to Marshall that J. N. Keynes’s position was midway between that 
of Marshall and his own. Marshall (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 179) responded in conciliatory 
tone to Foxwell on 30 January 1897: ‘Most of the suggestions which I made on the proofs of 
Keynes’s Scope and Method were aimed at bringing it more into harmony with the views of 
Schmoller.’ Marshall thus emphasised his methodological affinities with a leading member of 
the younger German historical school. Although Marshall admitted differences of 
methodological emphasis with Foxwell, he did not make much of them. 
Overall, Foxwell was more sympathetic to deductive economic theory than 
Cunningham. In particular, Foxwell had been a friend of Jevons and was an admirer of his 
work. Foxwell (1919, p. 387-8) later documented that Cunningham’s ‘general depreciation of 
economic theory’ had enticed ‘friendly controversy’ from Foxwell himself, as well as from 
other Cambridge colleagues. Although, in this obituary of Cunningham, Foxwell also 
admitted that he had found himself ‘more and more inclined to move in his direction.’ 
Foxwell’s doctrinal breach with Marshall had slowly widened. In the late 1890s Marshall 
criticised the overly descriptive content of Foxwell’s teaching. After 1903, Foxwell joined 
Cunningham in arguing for more study of historical subjects on the Cambridge Economics 
Tripos. 
In contrast, Cunningham had entered the doctrinal battle much earlier and with much 
greater force, after he had lost against Marshall in the 1884 competition for the Cambridge 
chair. Like his predecessors in the German historical school, Cunningham (1885) defended 
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the focus on national economic units and aggregates. However, he aligned himself with the 
extreme empiricist wing of the historical school, thereby to become one of Marshall’s 
foremost antagonists (Maloney, 1985, pp. 99-105). Cunningham resolutely opposed the view, 
expressed convincingly by Marshall in his inaugural lecture, that theory could not be built on 
facts alone. In positivist terms, Cunningham defended the primacy of the facts. For 
Cunningham (1887, p. 8) economics should be primarily an empirical science, concerned with 
description and classification: 
Instead of aspiring to be a sort of Pure Physics of Society which assuming a single 
force – the individual desire for wealth – states the laws of the operation of this force 
in the supply and demand of different articles of value, Political Economy might for 
the present be content to observe and classify and describe and name as other sciences 
have been. ... No real advance can come from the statement of laws of phenomena 
which only hold good when a considerable number of cases are excluded as abnormal; 
if Political Economy is to rank with other empirical sciences one must try to classify 
the widely varied phenomena of industrial life ... as an empirical science in its 
classificatory stage. 
Hence, according to the above statement, Cunningham’s highly inadequate answer to the 
problem of historical specificity was that economists should be preoccupied with taxonomy. 
For Cunningham, the main role of ‘theory’ was to taxonomise categories for the purposes of 
empirical research. He objected to the assumptions of neoclassical economics in the following 
terms: 
The underlying assumption against which I wish to protest is ... That the same motives 
have been at work in all ages, and have produced similar results, and that, therefore, it 
is possible to formulate economic laws which describe the action of economic causes 
at all times and in all places. (Cunningham, 1892b, p. 493) 
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Cunningham (1892a, p. 12) also wrote at about the same time: ‘We cannot then hope to find 
any strictly economic doctrine that gives us an adequate explanation of the phenomena of 
exchange in all times in all places’. Interestingly, Cunningham (1892b, p. 492) saw Spencer’s 
work as an example of the dangers of excessive universality in theory. He dismissed Spencer 
thus: ‘since he professes to know laws according to which all organisms develop, he need not 
trouble about the actual facts’. But this is a non sequitur. Knowledge of laws does not 
necessarily obviate the need for parametric and other data. Cunningham’s remark was a 
sideways blow also against Marshall, who greatly admired Spencer. 
It is true that Cunningham’s insistence that economic theory had to have a strong, 
historically specific component illuminated Marshall’s failure to develop one. However, 
Cunningham almost completely ruined his case by replacing this by a taxonomic empiricism, 
and by failing to recognise that even taxonomy requires some universal principles before it 
can proceed. Cunningham (1892a, p. 2) wrote: ‘Economic doctrine about the actual world we 
live in is all built up as a branch of empirical knowledge; it has no universality.’ Cunningham 
did not seem to realise that the negation of universality is itself a universal statement and that 
all empirical knowledge requires universal categories. Cunningham’s extreme, untenable and 
self-contradictory empiricist position denied the very conceptual tools upon which all enquiry 
must proceed. Furthermore, Cunningham’s criticisms of Marshall were so overstated and 
unconvincing that he became ‘an outsider even among historical economists’ such as Foxwell 
and William Ashley (Koot, 1987, p. 146). 
Marshall (1892) responded to Cunningham. However, the Cunningham-Marshall 
debate did not go into great methodological depth. Marshall again conceded much of the 
historical school case: historical enquiry was essential for economic theory. Especially given 
this concession, Marshall’s position was an attractive one, even for those young scholars who 
saw much of value in the work of the historical school. While valuing historical research, 
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Marshall successfully argued that theoretical analysis was required to make sense of causal 
processes in history. In a clear reference to Cunningham, Marshall wrote to Foxwell on 27 
March 1899 criticising those ‘who are studying economic history as a mere series of facts’ 
(Whitaker, 1996 vol. 2, p. 251). 
A pale shadow of the Austro-German Methodenstreit, this British altercation over 
methods left Cunningham isolated and Marshall in a much stronger position. On the question 
of historical specificity, Marshall had conceded to the historical school, but from a 
philosophical standpoint that was stronger than that of his principal British adversary. 
Marshall chastised Cunningham for his naïve empiricism, not for his attention to the problem 
of historical specificity. 
The Cunningham-Marshall controversy again came to the boil in the early 1900s. 
Although the controversy then involved the policy matter of free trade, the focal and decisive 
issue was the content of the economics curriculum in Cambridge. When the Economics 
Tripos was established in Cambridge in 1903, two full years of undergraduate study were 
devoted to economic theory, with only one year remaining for applied economics, economic 
history and politics. Cunningham protested. In 1905 the Economics Faculty Board posted a 
notice advising students that Dr. Cunningham, Director of Studies in Economics at Trinity 
College, ‘has publicly declared himself to be out of sympathy with the study of economics 
under the direction of this Board’. Accordingly, students preparing for the examinations in 
economics were advised to seek council elsewhere (Koot, 1987, p. 149; Kadish, 1989, p. 218). 
This made Cunningham’s permanent position at Cambridge unsustainable, and the following 
year he resigned his college fellowship. Cunningham’s intransigent polarisation of the dispute 
encouraged a bureaucratic and doctrinal reaction, which led to outcomes opposite to those that 
he intended. 
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Like many in the older (but not the younger) German historical school, Cunningham 
saw the salvation of theory in terms of empirical enquiry alone. He failed to understand 
Menger’s forceful argument that even empiricism requires prior universal assumptions, such 
as the uniformity of nature. All empirical work requires prior universal concepts, such as units 
of measure. Taxonomies themselves require classificatory schema. All such concepts are tied 
up with explicit or implicit theories about the world. Theory is unavoidable, and has epistemic 
priority over facts. Cunningham did not understand this. Marshall did. It was tragic for the 
British historical school that some of its exponents fought on such weak methodological 
ground. 
The historical school was not uniform in its methodology. Previous accounts of 
Marshall’s relations with historical school have downplayed the difference between the 
historicists who developed theory (such as Gustav von Schmoller, Max Weber and Werner 
Sombart) and the more empiricist historicists (such as Wilhelm Roscher and William 
Cunningham). Marshall sympathised much more with Schmoller and his followers, although 
he went further than Schmoller in emphasising the analytical priority of theory. 
The philosophical untenability of the empiricist position is not sufficiently emphasised 
in some modern accounts. Marshall was right to insist that empirical enquiry was impossible 
without theory, and that theory had priority. Like the astute historicists in Germany, Marshall 
had assimilated Menger’s critique of empiricist historicism. So when he took dislike to some 
of the views of some of his historicist critics, it was their naïve empiricism rather than their 
historicism to which he primarily took exception. There is no major inconsistency between his 
public and his private persona here. Both his letters and his publications criticise empiricism, 
on the one hand, and praise the German historicist theorists, on the other. His tributes to the 
German historical school are repeated in his publications, up to and including the later 
editions of his Principles.[10]
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Neither is it accurate to characterise Marshall’s methodological views as simply 
‘eclectic’ with Marshall ‘prepared to use any method that produced helpful and useful results’ 
(Moggridge, 1997, p. 365). On the contrary, Marshall’s criticism of those who believed that 
theories could be spun from facts was relatively sophisticated for his time. Although 
Marshall’s drive for a robust economic theory was eventually harnessed by his more 
formalistic neoclassical successors, the choice in 1885 was largely between historically 
informed theory, on the one hand, and naïve empiricism, on the other. Marshall adopted the 
stronger philosophical position. The tragedy is that Marshall failed to develop a theoretical 
framework within which the full sweep of historical development and structural change could 
be accommodated. 
In the 1885-1908 period (from Marshall’s inaugural lecture to his retirement) the 
general mood was one of Marshallian politeness and conciliation, rather than the disharmony 
of the Germanic Methodenstreit. Indeed, it is somewhat misleading to describe the Cambridge 
arguments of the period as a Methodenstreit at all. To repeat, unlike Menger, Marshall had 
explicitly recognised the problem of historical specificity. Regarding the contest between 
deductive and inductive methods – the second aspect of the Germanic Methodenstreit – a 
superficial but inadequate resolution had been reached when Marshall, like Schmoller, had 
accepted that both methods had to be combined: ‘as the left foot and the right foot are both 
needed for walking.’ Remarkably, these methodological discussions reached a high degree of 
consensus. The fact that a methodological dispute persisted at all was more to do with the 
relative intransigence of naïve empiricists like Cunningham, who never accepted a major role 
for economic theory. But the intransigent empiricists were never representative of either the 
German or the British historical schools in their totality. Compared with the clashes between 
Menger and Schmoller, the British Methodenstreit never reached the same degree of intensity 
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or venom over methodological issues. In the British case, Methodendiskurs would be a better 
term. 
Far from Marshall being an antagonist of historicism, it would be better to see 
Marshall as a representative and extension of the type of historically sensitive and 
theoretically informed thinking that had emerged in Germany by the end of the nineteenth 
century. To put it truthfully but provocatively, Marshall himself was a product and part of the 
historical school tradition. 
It may be objected, however, that the net result of Marshall’s particular efforts to 
assert the primacy of theory was to establish a neoclassical tradition that became 
progressively more formal, more technical, narrower and less historical. There is an element 
of truth here, but Marshall bears only part of the responsibility for the outcome. Crucially, 
despite his persistent recognition of the importance of the problem, Marshall never developed 
an adequate theoretical framework to deal with the issue of historical specificity. But other 
factors were beyond his control. In particular, the fragmented British historical school was 
much weaker than the German, and it lacked a sizeable cohort of methodologically and 
theoretically astute researchers. 
Both such factors were in play when Marshall retired in 1908, and he did his best to 
ensure that the youthful Arthur Pigou got the job. Although Pigou was only 30 years of age at 
the time of the election of the chair, he had published much more extensively than Foxwell. 
To Foxwell’s chagrin and astonishment, Pigou’s application was successful.[11]
Pigou subsequently developed formalistic aspects of Marshallian theory, addressing 
welfare economics and other matters. Whatever the merits and justification of Pigou’s 
appointment to the chair, it is clear in retrospect that the elevation of this brilliant, but very 
young, theoretical economist marked the end of the period of Cambridge’s intensive 
engagement with the German historical school. The huge generational leap from Marshall to 
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Pigou meant the loss of much of the knowledge and awareness of historicism. If Pigou knew 
anything much about the German historical school, it is not apparent in his writing. Still a tiny 
department, with no more than two dozen undergraduate students (Groenewegen, 1995, p. 
553), there were few to pass on an oral tradition of Marshallian connections with German 
historicism. Cambridge economics thus entered a period of relative intellectual isolation. 
 
A pluralistic academy 
Despite the historical caricatures of Robbins and others, the Marshallian period was one in 
which theorists and historicists worked alongside one another: there were differences of view 
but never a complete compartmentalisation, of viewpoints. For example, the young Ashley – 
eventually to become a guiding light of the British historical school in the early twentieth 
century – was critical of aspects of Marshall’s Principles but concluded with the following 
significant tribute and concordant evaluation: 
The Principles of Economics is a work worthy of its author’s reputation, and of his 
position as the doyen of English economists. … It is the more welcome because it 
brings a message of conciliation to divergent schools, and it makes it possible for 
‘deductive’ and ‘historical,’ ‘scientific’ and ‘ethical’ economists to work together in 
harmony. (Ashley, 1891, p. 489) 
A similarly pluralistic spirit was evident when Edgeworth, the leading neoclassical economist 
and first editor of the Economic Journal, opened the first volume: 
The Economic Journal … will be open to writers of different schools. The most 
opposite doctrines may meet here as on a fair field. … Nor will it be attempted to 
prescribe the method, any more than the result, of scientific investigation. (Edgeworth, 
1891, p. 1) 
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We find clear and plentiful evidence of the implementation of this pluralist policy in the early 
volumes of the Economic Journal. There are signs of the influence of historical school 
thinking on British economics, including challenges to the atomistic individualism of some 
economic theorists. In the theory of consumption, for instance, there were attempts to go 
beyond atomistic individualism and develop the theory of interdependent and socialised 
consumers. Henry Cunynghame (1892) discussed the interdependence of consumer demands, 
thus setting the limits of the independent individual. Caroline Foley (1893) went much 
further. Starting from a recognition of the historical specificity of socio-economic structures 
and behaviour, she saw the need to study consumption as a real, historically conditioned and 
socially structured process. Pigou (1903, 1913) subsequently made two attempts to 
incorporate interdependent and intersubjective aspects of consumer demand into neoclassical 
analysis. But Pigou (1913, p. 24) himself came to the conclusion that these attempts were 
‘wholly inadequate’. Not being readily formalised, these issues were eventually to slip off the 
agenda of mainstream economists in a later period (Mason, 1995; Fullbrook, 1998). 
The failure of the British historicists was in part due to their own conception of 
scientific advance. None of the leading figures of the British school was able to build an 
alternative methodology or theory, and they remained largely entrapped by an empiricist 
epistemology. Largely for this reason, and despite the persistent influence of a few 
individuals, the historical school failed to establish an enduring bridgehead in the British Isles. 
Gradually pushed aside in academic argument, several members of the British historical 
school made their way into the discipline of economic history, embraced empiricism, and 
abandoned economic theory to the theorists. Crucially, the British historicists were 
overshadowed in the crucial encounters that occurred during the professionalisation of 
economics, and the establishment of distinct economics departments in several British 
universities in early part of the twentieth century.[12]
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In justice, William Ashley and John A. Hobson were probably the two historicists 
sufficiently well qualified to succeed to Marshall’s chair in 1908. Crucially for the fate of 
English economics, Ashley was away at the universities of Toronto and Harvard in the crucial 
years of from 1888 to 1900. A graduate of Oxford, he returned to become Professor of 
Commerce at the University of Birmingham in 1901. Ashley disliked the drift towards ‘pure 
theory’ and argued for an economics based on history and business experience. His relatively 
sophisticated brand of historicism had explicit ‘evolutionary’ connotations, and he had an 
important influence on the important but fledgling subdiscipline of business economics 
(Ashley, 1907, 1924, 1926). 
Hobson (1902, 1911, 1914) openly embraced the metaphor of society-as-an-organism 
that was so central to German historicism. Fatefully, Hobson (1902) had criticised Marshall’s 
marginal utility theory. Although there are clear flaws in Hobson’s argument, Marshall also 
did not come out of this debate without error (Maloney, 1985). Nevertheless, Marshall and his 
followers kept Hobson at arm’s length. The influential American economist Richard Ely 
wrote to Marshall on 11 October 1901: ‘I think that there is a feeling in this country that the 
English economists have not done justice to Hobson’ (Whitaker, vol. 2, p. 336). Indeed, 
Hobson has never received his due. He authored no less than 53 books and hundreds of 
articles, and influenced twentieth century thinkers as important as Lenin and J. M. Keynes. 
Yet he was denied any university post. He died in 1940 as the last – and most long-lived – of 
the British historicists. His death marked the end of a tradition that failed to establish an 
enduring foothold and identity in British universities. This did not mean, however, that it did 
not make a mark. In a qualified by significant sense, one of its most important representatives 
of British historicism was Marshall himself. 
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Notes 
[1] This essay draws extensively from Hodgson (2001, ch. 8). 
[2] On Marshall’s complex and enigmatic character see Groenewegen (1995, ch. 21) and T. W. Jones (1978). 
[3] Nevertheless, of course, the methodological and theoretical issues were linked in the discussion. See Seager 
(1893) for an early account of the context and content of the controversy. 
[4] See the several positive references to Knies, List, Roscher, Schäffle, Schmoller, Wagner and other German 
historicists that are indexed in Marshall (1919, 1949), and in Marshall and Marshall (1881). 
[5] At the time, Seager (1893, p. 237) quoted Marshall’s conciliatory and eclectic methodological statements in 
his Principles, and concluded that: ‘What Professor Marshall says in regard to method may be quoted as a very 
fair summary of contemporary German opinion.’ Along broadly similar lines, Shove (1942, p. 309) later 
remarked: ‘If any school of thought outside the Ricardian tradition set its mark on the Principles it was the 
Historical School, rather than the marginal utility school, that did so.’ One of the few post-1945 commentators to 
likewise emphasise Marshall’s methodological continuity with the German historical school was Hutchison 
(1988, p. 529) who wrote: ‘Alfred Marshall, under German influence, made a strenuous attempt to re-graft a 
historical-institutional approach on to the neo-classical abstraction.’ 
[6] A problem with Schmoller’s statement, however, is that a mixture of two philosophically unsatisfactory 
methods – induction and deduction – is unlikely to produce a satisfactory result. The intention here is to show 
the endorsement of Schmoller by Marshall, rather than to sanction Schmoller’s methodological formulation. 
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[7] The historical school of the British Isles is often mistakenly described as the ‘English’ historical school. 
However, its earliest leaders, such as Leslie and Ingram, were born and taught in Ireland. Cunningham, who was 
Marshall’s antagonist in Cambridge, was born in Scotland. 
[8] Notably, in his successful application for the Tooke Chair, Cunningham secured a positive reference from 
Marshall (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 33). 
[9] This is an extract from Foxwell’s unsuccessful 1901 application to the chair of commerce at the University of 
Birmingham, to which Ashley was in fact appointed (quoted in J. M. Keynes, 1972, p. 270). 
[10] In general, Marshall dealt with his antagonists with civility. Perhaps Marshall’s most hostile statement 
against the empiricist historians was in his letter to J. N. Keynes of 27 May 1889 where he wrote: ‘I want 
however to keep my hold on the Historical men: they are Kittle-Kattle, and yet important’ (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 
1, p. 290). Yet this statement has an unclear meaning. It does not imply that Marshall was hostile to the historical 
school as a whole. The phrase ‘Kittle-Kattle’ could be a reference to the ‘Chit Chat Club’. This was a select and 
exclusive academic circle within the University of Cambridge, limited to 15 members. Cunningham, Foxwell 
and J. N. Keynes were members but strangely Marshall was never invited to join (Groenewegen, 1995, pp. 110, 
444). 
[11] Cannan and Ashley were the other two candidates for Marshall’s chair. For discussions of the reasons and 
processes behind Foxwell’s rejection and Pigou’s appointment see Coase (1972), Coats (1968, 1972), T. W. 
Jones (1978) and Groenewegen (1995, pp. 622-7). Coase (1972) points out that in 1900-1908, Pigou published 
no less than ten articles in the Economic Journal and five books. In contrast, in the same period, Foxwell 
published no books and just one substantial article – in the Palgrave Dictionary of Political Economy. On the 
other hand, Foxwell’s service to the university was much the greater. Marshall’s correspondence reveals his 
criticisms of Foxwell. In a letter to Foxwell of 12 February 1906, Marshall politely and honestly noted their 
personal differences in ‘ideals in economics’ and of academic judgment. The most revealing letter is to J. N. 
Keynes, dated 13 December 1908. Here Marshall criticised Foxwell as a lecturer who ‘imposes his judgment on 
youth’ rather than trying ‘to develop faculty, and to leave judgment to be formed later’. Marshall also wrote: 
‘Foxwell’s judgments, while always confident, are likely to be in opposite directions at six months notice, I have 
fear of his judgments. … He seems never to see more than one side of any complex question’ (Whitaker, 1996, 
vol. 3, pp. 126, 215). Notably, Groenewegen (1995, p. 625) argued convincingly that Marshall did not abandon 
support for Foxwell and support Pigou as is future successor until 1906. In supporting Pigou, Marshall had acted 
on his academic judgment, but it caused an irreparable breach with his closest friend. 
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[12] See Kadish (1989), Kadish and Tribe (1993), Koot (1987) and Maloney (1985). However, the growth of 
economics in Britain as a separate discipline under the leadership of Marshall and his followers, and its 
separation from economic history, did not amount to a ‘disintegration of political economy’ as some have 
suggested. In truth, neither Marshall nor his predecessors had an adequately integrated system of political 
economy. If there was any ‘integration’ before (say) 1900 it was more to do with the fact that these subjects were 
often taught together, rather than the existence of any guiding overall framework or discipline of ‘political 
economy’. Furthermore, the story concerning the relationship between economics and economic history is very 
different in Germany and the USA, and we cannot generalise from the British experience 
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